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I INTRODUCTION
During the past three years (1967-1970), there have
been major efforts to expand the role of the State Sector
in a number of East and Central African states. The decisions
to expand the state sector made in various forms in Tanzania,
Zambia, Uganda and Congo-Kinshasa, were aimed in part to
deal with the basic problem of economic dependence.
Following political independence, economic dependence
persisted in certain crucial respects. Dependence extended
beyond the fact of foreign ownership of certain parts of
the economy, although foreign ownership did, in some ways act
as a key link in maintaining a dependent economic system.
Dependence consisted of reliance on foreign decision-making
and foreign resources, and of stunted development of indigenous
institutions. Development of the state sector could both
reduce rhe degree of foreign control and provide the basis
for the development of indigenous economic institutions.
Q.e notable attempt to define an approach to the public
sector relevant to the contemporary Third World was made
by Ignacy Sachs. He identified two characteristic approaches-
the "Japanese" approach and the "Indian" approach. Under
both patterns the state takes on a crucial role in raising
the rate of accumulation and accelerating the rate of growth.
"The 'Japanese pattern' consists of large transfers of public
funds to the private sector, and of the State performing
the so-called 'pioneering functions' in lieu, and on behalf
of private capitalists ... The 'Indian pattern' strives
at ensuring the primacy of the State in the basic branches
* Brian Van Arkadje is a Fellow of the Institute. This
article is a sunmary of a longer paper, to appear in a volume
planned under editorship of Professor D. Ghai.
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of industry and at weakening the concentration of capital
,.. But even in India elements of the 'Japanese pattern'
may be found, side by side with those of the 'Indian
pattern' ."(l)
Sachs image incorporates a useful framework for consid-
ering some of the problems of the public sector in a contemp-
orary developing country. It retains, however, as its
central focus the task of accumulation. In the economies
we are considering, the problems to be overcome in mobilising
development effort can only be understood if the nature
of the excessive dependence of these economies is first
analysed. Indeed, tackling the problem of economic dependence
may well be a prerequisite to the implementation of successful
development policies in general, and to sufficiently raising
the rate of accumulation in particular.
Although the effects of dependence do manifest themselves
in the difficulties of sustaining high levels of capital
formation, the dimensions of dependence extend into managerial,
technical and entrepreneurial factors, and the existing
forms of commodity specialisation are an outcome of the
historical pattern of dependence. A formally public institution
can easily be the means of continuing dependence on private
foreign interests, if it operates as a front for foreign
managers, promoters and exploitation by foreign knowhow,
and its policies reinforce dependent relationships in commodity
markets.
II DEPENDENCE
Economic independence is often recognised by economists
as a policy objective, but is viewed as political in origin,
non-economic (if not irrational) in character. The pursuit
of economic independence is then viewed as one objective
which can be traded off against others (e.g. growth). This
leaves the underlying neo-classical model intact as a descrip-
tion of optimal growth behaviour.
Yet it seems likely that economic independence, although
certainly a national aspiration, is also a necessary condition
for the achievement of other development goals.
(1} Lgnacy Sachs, Pate)tri4 o the. PLthL S.c.to'i. .L'i L(nde-
deve2opd Ec.öno'vLe2, 1963, p.180-181.
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The people of East and Central Africa remain dependent
on foreign economic interests because of differentials
in:
access to information;
access to managerial skills;
(e) baraining strength in important commodity
markets;
control of important assets;
claims on income flows.
Items (d) and (e) result from foreign ownership in the domes-
tic economy; (a), (b) and (c) do not derive primarily
from ownership.
Emphasis is placed on information and management
both because the economist's approach typically neglects
them, emphasising instead financial and commodity flows,
and because technique and managerial capacity are increasingly
important elements in modern economic activity.
The condition of dependence is to be analysed not
only n terms of flows between economies (e.g. trade and
capital movements), but also in terms of the impact on the
internal organisation of the dependent economy. Key elements
on the dependent side acquiesce in the relationship, or
even actively assimilate attitudes supportive of the relation-
ship. To quote Fanon: "The national middle-class discovers
its historic mission: that of intermediary."(l)
The structure of production which characterises under-
development is well-known. (2) Under the colonial system,
the pattern of development created an economic dependence
on primary commodity export markets. The dangers of such
a dependence, particularly where a monoproduct system was
involved, have been emphasised (possibly over-emphasised)
in the literature. However, there are other factors as
important as the dangers of over-specialisation in the world
commodity market. The form of African participation in
this trade was through the supply of labour power as workers
or peasants. Where large-scale capital or elaborate technical
F. Fanon, The. WvoJ'e.d o Ecth, New York, 1963,
p.124
This, and many other aspects of African dependence,
are summarised in UnLtg oit. ove)t-ti/,, R.H. Green and
A. Seidman, London, 1968, especially pp.31-51 and 91-131.
See also R.H. Green , S.tc6 úi Ecoktorn-Lc1 1)eveLopma'i-t, Bank
of Sudan, Khartoum, (no date).
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skills were required, these were under the control of foreign
or immigrant interests (e.g. copper in Katanga and Zambia,
sisal in Tanzania). Hirschman has stated the problem well:
"The opponents of free trade have often pointed
out that for a variety of reasons it is imprudent
and harmful for a country to become specialised
along certain product lines in accordance with the
dictates of comparative advantage. Whatever the
merit of these crítical arguments, they would certainly
acquire overwhelming weight if the question arose
whether a country should allow itself to become
specialised not just along certain commodity lines,
but along factor-of-production lines. Very few
countries would ever consciously wish to specialise
in unskilled labour, while foreigners with a comparative
advantage in entrepreneurship, management, skilled
labour and capital took over these functions, replacing
inferior 'local talent'." (1)
The economic pattern of dependence, which survived
the demise of the political system of colonialism, must
be understood as a system, the various parts of whIch reinforce
each other, and the meaning of which is not to be understood
by isolating one aspect separate from the whole.
The manifestation of the dependent relationship varied
from industry to industry. In copper, foreign control
of the industry resulted from ownership, but was also supported
by the evident lack of local capacity to organise production.
As the product is marketed internationally, control over
access to world markets could conceivably be used as an
additional means of reinforcing a dominant position.
In the newly-developing manufacturing and tourism
sectors, new patterns of dependence are emerging. In industry,
local assembly or processing of inputs produced by an investing
overseas firm ties the local factory to a particular source
of supply and allows that source of supply to reap the benefits
of the protected market, although not necessarily through
the apparent profit on the local venture. In some instances,
projects are promoted from abroad with modest foreign equity
ínvolvement, for the purpose of promoting the sale of foreign
machinery. In the tourist industry, dependence is associated
with a lack of local expertise in the hotel and similar
U) Albert O. Hirschman, "How to Divest in Latin America
and Why," (p.4), EI4ctyl. Ivtvtta.tiovtaL FÙ'iww.e, no. 76,
November, 1969, Princeton University.
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trades, as well as limited information about available
markets. The extension of the operations of multi-national
hotel chains and airlines into new areas creates additional
foreign control in one of the fastest growing sectors.
The firms which form the agency of external dependence
area mixed bag, ranging from the prototypical multi-national
mining firm, through the colonial commercial banking insti-
tutions, to smaller-scale trading firms. While it is fitting
to place the large, sophisticated multi-national corporation
at the centre of an analysis of continuing dependence,(1),
there was a range of far more modest businesses which had
developed during the colonial period. In some cases, such
as the sisal industry of Tanzania, foreign investment played
the minor role, local immigrant businessmen owning the
larger part of the industry.
The difficulties arising from dependence do not result
primarily from reliance on foreign markets. For small
economies, a high degree of integration in the world market
is unavoidable; autarchy is not a feasible alternative.
(However, the small size of African states is itself an
outcome of colonial history). Nor is the problem one of
reliance on foreign technology, which is inevitable. Rather
it is that access to foreign markets, foreign technology
and designs, and managerial talents came in a form. in which
understanding, access to information, and critical decisions
were either controlled elsewhere. Where such local elements
did exist they were drawn from the immigrant community.
If ownership were the only dimension of dependence,
tackling the problem would be straightforward. Indeed,
a degree of foreign ownership by itself causes no great
concern in many developed countries. The full significance
of foreign ownership can only be appreciated if it is seen
as part of the overall structure of dependence, in which
ownership patterns are part the cause, but also in part
the result, of other dimensions of dependence(2), involving
entrepreneurial, technical and managerial elements, as much
as reliance on foreign capital, narrowly defined.
VLde. Giovani Arrighi, Ivtekta.tLOta CokpoxctLov,
Lcthowi. A occ.iLe nd EconomJ Vve2opmeiit £n TxopLcc
ALc.a., (mimeographed, 1967, Dar-es-Salaam).
Lt is not necessary, for this analysis, to examine
the role of investment and its motivation - the pursuit of
profits and markets - as a driving force in imperialism.
Whatever the initial ímpetus at the imperial centre, the c0Thdi'
tion of dependen'ce in the colonial or neo-colonial- periphery
pervades all the dimensions of economic and social activity.
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The problem of dependence arose not only because of
the presence of foreign economic interests, but also because
of the absence of indigenous economic institutions capable
of operating effectively in those sectors dominated by them.
Where locally based finns achieved substantial size, they
grew from the businesses of the immigrant community (the
classic case being Madhvani, the successful Ugandan Asian
capitalist). Africans were successful farmers, and in
particular cases individuals did amass sizeable fortunes
from property, cattle-dealing, contracting, etc. However,
such African success stories did not give rise to industrial
or financial activities in sectors characteristically dominatec
by large-scale foreign business.(1)
Quite apart from any commitment to socialism, there
was an inevitable underlying tension following independence.
While African personnel took over the staffing of the civíl
service, strategic sectors of the economy remained expatriate-
staffed, apart from a certain amount of window-dressing, and
were certainly controlled by foreign business or immigrant
communities.
The existence of such tension was even recently demon-
strated in Kenya, where the government has been identified
with the most sympathetic policies toward foreign investment
in the region. A select Committee of the National Assembly
on Unemployment, reporting in 1970, stated that:
"For the Government effectively to exercise control
of the economy it must nationalise or acquire effective
shareholding in all major enterprises in the economy.
Side by side with the control of the economy
through nationalisation and/or acquisition of majority
shareholding in the major enterprise the present
(1) See Peter Marris and Anthony Somerset, A..Lc.ctn BuLne4s.o
men, London, 1970, Chapter 7, and 'Who Controls Industry in
Kenya?", Repox.t o a vJo'thivig pcvuty o -the NatLona2 Ch'uuitLan
Couiic.-U 06 Kenja., East African Publishing House, 1968, for
the two sides of the coin in Kenya. To quote Marris and
Somerset, "Since most of the densely settled parts of Kenya
lie within two hundred miles of each other, evn perishable
goods like bread can be supplied from a few manufacturing
centres. An African producer has to compete in a national
or international market from the outset. He cannot begin
with a small trade in familiar country. As soon as he
installs machinery and becomes more than a village cook or
craftsman, he faces the uninhibited competition of modern
machinery." p.166.
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effects of Kenyanisation should be accelerated."(l)
III EXPANSION OF THE STATE SECTOR
The colonial state had used state corporations for
its purposes; the British in Africa were particularly keen
on marketing boards. In the case of Uganda, public investment
had extended far and wide through the agencies of the
Uganda Development Corporation, the Uganda Electricity
Board and the marketing boards. In Tanzania, the Develop-
ment Corporation was, in the first place, mainly a repository
for assorted remnants of the groundnuts fiasco, to which
was added the lucrative governmental holdings in Williamson's
diamond mines. Even in the Congo, there has been a long,
if somewhat peculiar, history of public involvement in
the copper industry.
Early post-independence Plans placed heavy emphasis
on foreign investment, particularly in manufacturing. The
first Tanzanian Five Year Plan and the Seers mission report
to Zambia, which were received at the time as quite radical
documents, placed emphasis on change in the industrial
structure. The strategies proposed, however, if successfully
pursued, would have increased the dependence of the economies,
although in new forms. The fundamental paradox of the
period was that in adopting policies aimed at transforming
the industrial structure through the mobilisation of foreign
capital, the introduction of modern technology and the
hiring of foreign management, a new pattern of dependence
was being created.
That this approach had been accepted in the early
years following independence was not surprising. Initially
the political leadership faced the difficult challenge
of taking over and staffing the colonial state. The mechanics
of making the transfer, plus the need to expand the educational
system, were of highest priority.
The prevailing wisdom of development economists lent
support to the strategy adopted, through World Bank and
other advisory reports and through the work of economic
advisers. And, to be fair, even if an adviser believed
in the need for a more independent strategy, he was certainly
in no position to assert that need in the absence of a
local political initiative.
1) ¡Ze.pot o tke Se2ec.t CommLtte.e. on Unenip1ogment, Republic
of Kenya, National Assembly, December, 1970, p. 13.
The sharp change in direction came in January, 1967,
with the publication of the A)Lu4h0. Vecaia2-Lon, by the
TANU National Executive. The internal politics of TANU
which led up to the Declaration would be of some interest,
but the present writer has no insights, other than the
explicit statements of the Declaration itself. However,,
certain factors evident in the economy must have played
their part in preparing the ground for the Declaration.
The implementation of the Tanzania First Plan had
been notably unsuccessful in imp1eenting the ambitious
targets for the mobilisation of external funds. The relative
roles of private and public sector had been left ambiguous;
it was becoming evident that the political and bureaucratic
elites would have every opportunity to lever themselves
into desirable economic positions in the private sector.
However, this potential had not been realised to the point
of creating a substantial and entrenched property-owning
class sufficiently powerful to be an effective barrier
to political change.
The two policy themes of the Arusha Declaration were
socialism and self-reliance. Development of the theme
of self-reliance, for example, led to the conclusion that
emphasis must be placed on agriculture, on grounds somewhat
close to the comparative advantage argument, which has
appealed to circles outside Tanzania in which one might
expect other aspects on the Declaration to be anathemas.
Nationalization initiatives followed in Zambia and
Uganda. The Zambian nationalization of the copper industry
involved far more substantial amounts of assets (valued
at 75 million) than those involved in the Tanzanian national-
ization. The Uganda proposals were still being implemented
when the coup unseated President Obote this year; national-
ization measures are now being partially dismantled.
Export mining presents quite special characteristics,
in relation in technology, marketing and management needs,
whih make it particularly difficult to transform a position
of dependence by straightforward nationalization measures.
En general, in all the nationalizations, the acceptance
of a considerable degree of continued dependence was indicated
by the payment of substantial compensation and the completion
of elaborate and often costly management agreements, often
with the previous owners. The impact of the nationalization
measures in creating a basis for greater independence
will only be assessable as the expansion of local managerial
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capacity permits the State Corporations to end such management
agreements. Also, the initial progranmies are bound to
reflect inherited projects. The appearance of new strategies
at best will take some years.
IV THE ROLE OF THE STATE SECTOR tN ECONOMIC STRATEGY
Even in Tanzania, where the major part of the actual
process of nationalisation was carried out with great
dispatch, the period since has remained highly transitional
in that there is a large number of inmiediate administrative
tasks to be tackled.
Although evaluation is not yet possible, the nature
of the possibilities can be demonstrated by considering
two extreme models. The positive possibility is for the
state sector to become a major focus for local initiatives
to implement structural change and achieve a high level
of development mobilisation. More able to take a longer-
term view in assessing returns and more directly sensitive
to social costs and externalities in economic decision-
making, an improved development strategy becomes possible.
Tactically, greater flexibility is possible as it is no
longer necessary to depend on fiscal instruments or more
direct controls to influence a large private sector.(l)
Of course, verbal appeals to the importance of strategy
and structural change can only too easily be incantations
to cloak the pursuit of the expedient or to disguise confusion
of thought. Nevertheless, the experience of socialist
countries indicates that there are certain characteristic
advantages of the state sector, particularly in concentrating
and directing energies towards the completion of a few critical
tasks.
We do not need to be socialists to understand the effec-
tiveness of this process. Indeed, Gerschenkron has attempted
a generalisation that in the process of industrialisation:
(1) There is now an. increasing body of evidence on the
irrationalities and inefficiencies which have been endemic in
the use of protection - both tariffs and quotas - and exchange
controle as instruments of industrial policy in mixed economies
in the less developed world. (See the OECD studies on
industrialisation). Although it is possible to deWonstrate
that more effective policies are available, the pervasiveness
of inferior policy-making might suggest certain inherent
social and political inadequacies of the mixed economy as a
system for development.
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"The more backward a country's economy, the greater
was the part played by special institutional factors
designed to increase supply of capital to the nascent
industries and, in addition, to provide them with
less decentralised and better informed entrepreneurial
guidance; the more backward the country, the more
pronounced was the coerciveness and comprehensiveness
of those factors."(1)
Gerschendron here envisages certain crucial institutional
requirements, irrespective of whether the ultimate form
of development consists of the development of a capitalist
or socialist system. Some powerful institution must concen-
trate energies on crucial tasks beyond the competence of
local small-scale enterprise, and must provide sufficient
momentum for the creation of indigenous economic enterprises
capable of surviving in competition with other modern
centres of development.
To elucidate our understanding further, we might
examine in more detail those examples of successful growth
performance that Gerschenkron, for example, has in mind.
Much recent experience of state sector development in the
Third World, however, has been of experiments failing.
To analyse the issues facing the state sector, it might
be of more value to visualise a model at the other pole
from the successful role sketched in the preceding paragraphs
a model of frustrated state development. For this it
might be possible to draw on evidence from Ghana, Indonesia
and possibly India, or Bolivia. In the Ghanaian case,
for example, while the state certainly took up some part
of the vocabulary of socialist development and, in the
Volta project, might seem to have been attempting the
sort of breakthrough which characterises successful state-
sponsored development, there was an extraordinary dependence
upon external finance, continuing influence from foreign
businessmen and an apparent confusion about economic strategy.
Through the medium of short-term foreign credits, Ghana
generated bankruptcy for herself and handsome returns to
foreign capital goods exporters.C2) Also, in the event,
the excessive dependence on foreign business to implement
the Volta project meant that it did not fulfil initial
Alexander Gerschenkorn, EcovomÁc ßc(zvtdne Ln HLo'iíca2
Pexpc-tL'e, p. 354. We may note that this formulation is
politically loaded in its vocabulary; the coercion of the
market had its role in the earlier industrial revolutions.
See Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, "Ghana: End of An
Illusion", Month2g 1ZeuLew, July-August, 1966, pp. 120-123.
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hopes of providing the basis for substantial structural
change. (1)
A sketch of frustrated state sector development
in a dependent economy might be expected to have some or
all of the following characteristics:-
The development initiatives of the state corpora-
tions originate in crucial instances from foreign
promoters.
The most obvious beneficiaries of the operation
of state corporations (and, in the extreme cases,
the only domestic beneficiaries) are the bureaucracy.
This bureaucracy adopts the attitudes and
the self-same business criteria as the foreign business
people with whom they associate, while notably not
being able to match their managerial performance.
Market pressures for business efficiency are
reduced, yet there is no effective administrative
structure to maintain effective standards of operation.
(y) In the absence of an effectively defined
development strategy, project selection, even where
it emanates from domestic sources, is undertaken
in a piecemeal and arbitrary fashion, in many cases
at a much lower level of economic rationality than
under conditions of laissez faire private decision-
making.
Where some combination of the above conditions operate,
the state sector can become a great burden on the mass
of the society without generating development benefits.
Resources are dissipated by continuing foreign exploitation,
by an ineffective but privileged bureaucratic elite, and
through the high costs resulting from low levels of efficiency.
When the system gets into economic trouble there is no
reservoir of public support to maintain a development
effort through difficult times. The poor level of economic
effectiveness becomes doubly important when the political
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(1) ¿bLd. pp. 123-126. See also Ruth First, Th 8a-vLe.e
a Gwt, London, 1970, pp. 169-190, for an interesting
review of the economic record of the Nkrumah period.
system is itself organised at a modest level.(l)
The' importance of a coherent economic strategy for
the state sector derives not only from the positive possibil-
ities of using the state sector as an instrument for structural
change, but also because in the absence of an explicitly
defined source of strategy, which sets objectives and
criteria for performance, the operation of the sector
will depend upon a set of piecemeal initiatives. These
will stem largely from private promotors who identify profitable
possibilities in the operation of an expanded state sector,
or from the inertia of existing, often irrelevant, business
practices.
V THE STATE SECTOR IN OPERATION
To conclude, four areas are discussed which are strategic
in determining which path the state sector follows.
(a) Relations with foreign business
The possibilities of continued involvement through
the joint venture are writ large in the arrangements made
in a number of cases following nationalisation. In addition
to the straight profit to be made from any equity involve-
ment, there are three means whereby the foreign investor
can benefit from associating with state corporatioñ in
projects, all mentioned in the earlier part of this paper:
(j) Partnership may provide either a captive
market or source of supply enabling the firm to
profit at some other stage of the production
process.
(ji) The public corporation may be a suitable market
for machinery. Promoters may seek a profit from
the capital investment in a project.
(1) And, of course, the poor bureaucratic performance may
itself have its origins in an ambiguous anr! inappropriate
political situation. See Fitch and Oppenheimer, op. cLt.
Shivji raises some controversial questions about the
relationship between the state sector, elites and foreign
economic interests in Tanzania in a piece which is
probably unduly alarmist but nevertheless a healthy
contribution to the prevention of the tendencies he warns
against. See "The Silent Class Struggle" in the final issue
of Ck.Cke. and the comments by Walter Rodney and John Saul
in Mctj&-Ma.jL, No. 1, January, 1971.
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(iii) The management contract and provision of consulting
services provides another fertile field for foreign
business activity.
[n each of these cases mutually satisfactory deals
can be struck by the public enterprise, providing it has
honaßt, intelligent and skilful management. However, the
potential also exists for the public enterprise to provide
a framework for deals which are even worse than the effects
of unrestrained foreign investment.
The danger, in economic terms, is that the expansion
of the state sector creates conditions of monopoly power,
which can be used to achieve public development objectives,
but which can also provide heightened opportunities for
the exploitation of the local economy by foreign business,
in liaison with a well rewarded local group of bureaucratic
intermediaries.
(b) Co-ordination
The importance of the financial decisions, and
in particular the external economic relations, of key
parastatals lends urgency to the need for effective control.
In addition, there is an obvious danger of the employees
of parastatals using their positions to create substantial
privileges for themselves, at the expense of other sections
of the economy. There are also the familiar, but neverthe-
less correct, technical planning arguments for effective
co-ordination.
The extension of public ownership has located within
the parastatal sector investment decisions which are,
in the case of Tanzania, likely to be as large as those
of the central government itself, while in Zambia they
may prove to be larger.
If the capacity of the technical planning apparatus
is limited and the administrative civil service has little
experience of the new areas of economic decision-making
opened up by the extension of the state sector, the management
of the parastatals may be in a position to establish consid-
erable autonomy.
In the abstract, it might be argued that a high
degree of autonomy is no bad thing. This would be the
case if an independent but effective entrepreneurial capacity
were to be developed, subject of course to the need for
certain minimal macroeconomic controls, and centralised
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definition of relevant performance criteria. Autonomy
from local supervision can be disastrous, however, if
the state corporation remains heavily dependant on external
interests.
Cc) Relations with the domestic private sector
The extension of public ownership has been as often a
means of reinforcing capitalism as it has been of moving
towards socialism. Nationalisation in a context in which
one of the prime motive forces has been nationalism is
especially ambiguous. The public sector could become
the means of protecting and helping local private initiatives;
the ranks of the bureaucracy of the public sector and
government could b the recruiting ground of a generation
of capitalists. Moreover, the bureaucracy itself, in
some circumstances, could exercise power and enjoy, by
virtue of office, privileges not dissimilar from those
of a bourgeoisie.
The impact of economic policies on the relative
future balance between sectors shouldbe one explicit
dimension of policy-making. One virtue of tie state
corporation is that it can implement projects not immediately
profitable. However, when some coimnentators urge on
the state sector a programme of unprofitable tasks leaving
highly profitable, but possibly more frivolous, activities
with the private sector, this may provide private investors
with a ready source of surplus, the means of future growth.
Thus, emphasis on infrastructural, or capital goods industry
expansion in the state sector in a mixed economy can have
implicit in it the "Japanese model". Fiscal devices may
not provide a satisfactory method of transferring surplus
from a profitable private sector to an unprofitable public
corporation if the gap between the profitability of the
sectors is great and the private sector remains significant
in size.
(d) Workers' control
It may appear rather Utopian to finish this essay
with a discussion of workers' control. Is workers' control
a luxury, only to be indulged in when the level of productivity
has risen sufficiently to run risks of inefficiency in
the pursuit of other social goals? Such reactions very
readily arise and incorporate legitimate doubts. In
situations when the problems that management face already
seem so great, it might seem foolhardy to add another
complex dimension.
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However, quite apart from any virtues of industrial
democracy as a social goal, It may also be seen as a means
of responding to two critical problems:-
A trained, professional elite only too easily
become remote from the immediate problems, and
potentialities of indigenous society. This not
only results in a tendency for the elite to be biassed
towards urban needs, but even within urban society
they become insulated from the real needs of the
urban masses. Only too easily elites, although
formally recruited from the local population, become
part of a cultural enclave almost as much apart
from the board, mass of the society as the previous
colonial rulers.
The encouragement of workers' involvement in
management facilitates the possibility of recruiting
organisational and innovatory talents from amongst
the workforce. It is characteristic of effective
early stage economic growth (e.g. the industrial
revolution under capitalism) that there is a wide
field of recruitment for entrepreneurial abilities.
Dependence on highly bureaucratic methods of recruitment,
where the educational base is very narrow and access
to it necessarily highly random, limits the range
of available talent unduly, and establishes criteria
for recruitment which are heavily restrictive and
probably not too relevant.
The possibility of drawing on the members of the workforce
for innovations and relevant adaptations of foreign technology
is suggested by Chinese experience.(l) The translation
of such possibilities into an African context would require
the creation of a real vitality in party organisation
and a positive response from the bureaucratic elite.
In their analysis Arrighi and Saul have pointed
out the privileged role of the upper stratum of wage workers,
who are part of the "labour aristocracy" in the emerging
structures of contemporary African economies, enjoying
high incomes in the limited job openings provided by highly
(1) For a critical comment on the involvement of peasants
and workers in the process of technical innovation in China,
see C. H. G. Oldham "Science and Education in China",
BuÍ2etLn o the. AtornLc. Sc en,tLt6, June 1966, reprinted in
ComnhcLnL.t Cuiva.:Ch,Lvw. RectdLngs 3, (eds.) Franz Schurman
and Orville Schell, London, 1968.
36
capital-intensive import substitution, with interests
potentially at variance with those of the unemployed masses.
masses.(l) However, it remains the case that whatever
negative role this "labour aristocracy" plays within the
structure of dependent economies, it must also play a
key positive role in the creation of more satisfactory
patterns of growth. It is amongst the more skilled workers
and the bureaucratic elites that the necessary competence
exists to undertake so many of the necessary tasks of
economic transformation, not least of which is the creation
of institutions capable of operating independently and
effectively in the international economic environment.
The dilemma is a tricky one. The relatively small
elite amongst the skilled workforce and the bureaucracy
are needed. The maintenance of their morale and support
is a necessary condition of survival. At the same time,
however, as Saul has suggested, the mobilisation of popular
energies, and the raising of mass consciousness is another
necessary ingredient. (2)
The failure of a number of experiments in state-
directed development have come when the bureaucratic elites,
who were managing th system, became disaffected and
moved against the political regime. Although the rhetoric
of the regime associated ítself with the mass of the populace,
the practice of the regime alienated them, so that they
acquiesced in its fall.
See G. Arrighi and John S. Saul, "Nationalist and
Revolution in Sub-Saharan African", in The Soc.-LcLL.t
ReLo.et, London, 1969.
John S. Saul, "The Political Aspects of Independence",
paper presented to the Regional African Meeting of
Development Training and Research Institutes, Nairobi, 1971.
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